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THE TWO-SIDED SPEEDY TRIAL PROBLEM 
Brooks Holland∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Not So Speedy Trial Act,1 Shon Hopwood invokes the famous 
maxim, “justice delayed is justice denied,”2 to critique how the Speedy 
Trial Act of 1974 (“Act”) has been applied in federal courts.3 The Act, 
as Hopwood observes, was adopted to minimize long and largely 
unregulated delays in bringing criminal defendants to trial.4 Hopwood 
argues that, by demanding that trials take place within seventy days of a 
defendant’s indictment or initial appearance, the Act aims to protect the 
procedural justice interests of both defendants and the public.5 
In light of the “enormous public interest involved in speedy trials,” 
Hopwood surmises “that federal trial and appellate courts would follow 
the strict strictures of the Act.”6 But in reality, Hopwood posits, the Act 
does not accomplish the goal of uniformly speedy federal trials because 
defense lawyers, prosecutors, trial judges, and appellate courts collude to 
dodge the Act’s requirements by utilizing various doctrinal side steps.7 
This collusion, Hopwood continues, results from the convergence of 
institutional interests to de-prioritize uniformly speedy trials,8 and the 
fact that “there is no real incentive for anyone to follow the Act.”9 To 
minimize the doctrinal discordance between the Act and real-world 
practice, Hopwood prescribes how lawyers, academics, and federal 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. The author currently serves as 
Chair of the Washington State Bar Association Council on Public Defense, and is a member of the 
Society of American Law Teachers Board of Governors. 
1.  Shon Hopwood, The Not So Speedy Trial Act, 89 WASH. L. REV. 709 (2014). 
2.  Id. at 710. 
3.  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012). 
4.  See Hopwood, supra note 1, at 712–16. 
5.  See id. 
6.  Id. at 710. 
7.  See id. at 738–39 (summarizing non-compliance with the Act by prosecutors, defense lawyers, 
and courts). 
8.  See id. at 739. 
9.  Id. at 738–39. 
31 
                                                     
Speedy Trial - Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/14/2015  1:47 PM 
32 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 90:31 
courts can better fulfill the Act’s requirements.10 
Hopwood has written a valuable paper, and I cannot question his 
thorough research into the Act’s history and design, his diagnosis of how 
lawyers and judges may avoid the Act’s requirements, and his 
prescription for ensuring fuller doctrinal compliance with the Act. 
Instead, I wish to enlarge the criminal justice inquiry that I believe 
Hopwood’s paper invites. The interest in speedy trials highlighted by 
Hopwood is not restricted to federal courts.11 On the contrary, the vast 
majority of criminal cases are heard in state courts,12 which are 
controlled by state speedy trial statutes.13 I do not assume that Hopwood 
means to speak solely to federal courts operating under the Act when he 
emphasizes that justice delayed is justice denied. Rather, the premise 
underlying Hopwood’s call for stricter doctrinal compliance with the Act 
appears to be that more uniformly speedy trials will ensure greater 
justice for everyone—that efficient justice is a stand-alone priority for 
our criminal justice system in whatever court those delays may occur. 
If we apply Hopwood’s underlying premise about speedy trials to the 
criminal justice system beyond federal court, what picture will we see? I 
believe we will see that Hopwood’s concern over trial delays remains 
quite valid regardless of venue. The states also suffer from chronic 
institutional delays—some delays even more startling than the federal 
court examples that Hopwood chronicles.14 But this fuller picture may 
10.  See id. at 740–45. 
11.  See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967) (incorporating Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial right against the states as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause). 
12.  The dominance of the state courts in adjudicating criminal matters can be seen in some 
relative data. For example, in 2006, federal district courts had 66,860 total criminal filings of any 
kind. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, SUNY ALBANY, available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5112006.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). By contrast, in 
that same year, state courts recorded 1,132,290 felony convictions alone. See id., available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5442006.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). This state-federal 
criminal caseload disparity also can be seen in correctional data. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Correctional Populations in the United States, at 11–12 (2013), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (reporting 
that of a total correctional population in the United States in 2013 of 6,906,200 persons, 6,559,200 
persons were incarcerated under state jurisdiction, and 347,000 persons were incarcerated under 
federal jurisdiction; and of 2,217,000 persons in physical custody, 2,002,000 persons were in state 
prisons or local jails, and 215,000 were in federal custody). 
13.  See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (West 2006); WASH. CRIM. R. 3.3(b) (2015). For a 
brief history of how Washington State’s speedy trial law evolved from a statutory rule to a court 
rule, see WASH. STATE COURTS, Washington State Courts – Time for Trial, available at 
https://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_tft/index.cfm?fa=pos_tft.reportDisplay&fileName=
appendixB (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
14.  See infra notes 19–28. 
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reveal that the problem with delayed trials is only one side of a larger 
and pressing criminal justice dynamic. Some cases are tried too slowly, 
as Hopwood persuasively demonstrates. Many other cases, however, are 
tried too speedily, in ways that equally undermine any sound conception 
of criminal justice. 
This two-sided speedy trial dynamic results from the reality of 
modern criminal justice. Theoretically, our criminal courts offer a trial-
based system of justice. But in reality, the criminal justice system 
trudges toward adversarial trials far less often than it hurtles to barely 
adversarial plea-bargained dispositions. Consequently, in thousands of 
misdemeanor and even felony matters each year, the speedy trial 
problem includes the mirror image of justice delayed: a system of 
rushed, unconsidered justice with very few trials, or even specters of 
trials. 
In this response, I will suggest that the principal phenomenon driving 
Hopwood’s premise may not be a lack of doctrinal compliance with the 
Act or any other speedy trial law, but instead the lack of adequate 
criminal justice resources. More robust resources should minimize many 
of the incentives identified by Hopwood for lawyers and judges to drag 
their feet in proceeding to trial. At the same time, more resources should 
slow the process for some of the thousands of cases that swiftly and 
routinely are plea-bargained, and maybe even place a few more of those 
cases on track for an actual trial. Thus, if we improve criminal justice 
resources to adequate levels, we will realize more fully the benefits of 
the valuable doctrinal reforms advocated by Hopwood. 
I. A TWO-SIDED SPEEDY TRIAL PROBLEM 
Hopwood documents numerous instances of lengthy pre-trial delay 
that appear unrelated to the administration of justice.15 Trial courts 
countenance these delays under the Act, Hopwood maintains, by 
improperly accepting speedy trial waivers or by granting ends-of-justice 
continuances without an adequate basis.16 Further, trial courts are not 
incentivized to act differently because appellate courts rarely reverse 
these decisions and do not hold defense counsel accountable for failing 
to press for a speedy trial.17 
These institutionalized trial delays are a criminal justice problem that 
extends well beyond federal courts. The New York Times, for instance, 
15.  See Hopwood, supra note 1, at 716–38. 
16.  See id. at 716–29. 
17.  Id. at 729–38. 
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profiled the County of Bronx, New York, as offering perhaps some of 
the worst examples of institutionalized trial delay.18 As the Times’ series 
of articles reported, “a plague of delays in the Bronx criminal courts is 
undermining one of the central ideals of the justice system, the promise 
of a speedy trial.”19 This report noted that in 2011, New York City had 
141 defendants who had waited more than three years in jail for a trial, 
with eighty-five of these cases in the Bronx.20 These excessive delays 
extended to misdemeanor cases,21 and responsibility was laid at the feet 
of the court, prosecutors, and defense lawyers.22 These delays have 
proliferated notwithstanding New York’s own speedy trial statute, and 
for reasons that may track Hopwood’s diagnosis of the Act’s own 
failings.23 
Delays of this magnitude are inexcusable, and they inflict more than 
theoretical harms. A recent article in The New Yorker powerfully 
illustrated these harms in the case of Kalief Browder.24 Browder was 
charged with robbery at the age of sixteen, and was held in jail at Riker’s 
Island pending trial.25 Browder refused to plead guilty and demanded a 
trial.26 But that trial never happened.27 And by the time the prosecution 
moved to dismiss the case, Browder, who had entered jail at sixteen, 
“had missed his junior year of high school, his senior year, graduation, 
the prom. He was no longer a teen-ager; four days earlier, he had turned 
twenty.”28 The tragic circumstances of these delays make Hopwood’s 
proposals to invigorate the Act, or any other speedy trial law, easy to 
embrace. 
Yet, for every Kalief Browder, numerous individuals receive too 
18.  See infra notes 19–22. 
19.  William Glaberson, Waiting Years for Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at A1. 
20.  William Glaberson, For 3 Years After Killing, Evidence Fades as Suspect Sits in Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, at A20. 
21.  See William Glaberson, Even for Minor Crimes in Bronx, No Guarantee of Getting a Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1. 
22.  See William Glaberson, Court in Slow Motion, Exhibit A: One Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2013, at A1. 
23.  See Thomas M. O’Brien, The Undoing of Speedy Trial in New York: The ‘Ready Rule’, N.Y. 
L.J. (Jan. 14. 2014), available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202638065307/The-
Undoing-of-Speedy-Trial-in-New-York-the-Ready-Rule (identifying how case law has weakened 
New York’s speedy trial statute, and suggesting fixes). 
24.  Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014, at 26–32. 
25.  Id. at 26. 
26.  Id. at 28, 30. 
27.  Id. at 31. 
28.  Id. 
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speedy of a trial, because our criminal justice system is no longer 
principally a trial system. Rather, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
acknowledged, “ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system 
of trials.’”29 This plea system prioritizes and rewards early guilty pleas, 
which relieve an overburdened system of the resources and uncertainty 
that extended pre-trial litigation and trial would require.30 And nowhere 
is the speedy guilty plea more prevalent than with misdemeanor cases, 
because “the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than 
felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, 
regardless of the fairness of the result.”31 
As a result, “[i]n many jurisdictions, cases are resolved at the first 
court hearing, with minimal or no preparation by the defense. . . . This 
process is known as meet-and-plead or plea at arraignment/first 
appearance.”32 Indeed, “it is common for defense counsel in our large 
urban courts to offer a guilty plea on behalf of their clients within 
minutes of having first met the defendant.”33 Misdemeanor convictions 
nevertheless can impact individuals’ lives tremendously, not only due to 
the loss of liberty that can result, but also from the myriad “collateral 
consequences” that can follow convictions for even seemingly minor 
criminal offenses.34 
29.  Missouri v. Frye, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 
__U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Overview of Federal 
Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 2013, at 5 (Aug. 2014) (reporting that in the federal system, “[t]he vast 
majority of offenders plead guilty. In fiscal year 2013, 96.9 percent of all convicted defendants 
pleaded guilty”); JaneAnne Murray, A Better Way to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2015, at 
A27 (commenting that “[o]ur modern criminal justice system is designed to avoid jury 
trials. . . . Once charged, defendants are encouraged to plead guilty in part to avoid the ‘trial 
penalty’—a longer sentence after trial, often a much longer one”). 
30.  See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 306–07 (2011) (commenting that “judges, defense 
counsel, and prosecutors all have enormous incentive to pursue early guilty pleas—as early as the 
initial arraignment in some jurisdictions”); Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, 
or Transformative Impact, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 207 (2011) (noting the “premium on, and 
pressure for, guilty plea dispositions at the first possible moment”); NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., 
Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, at 33 
(Apr. 2009) (noting “one time only” plea offers and other pressure for defendants to plead guilty 
early in the proceeding) [hereinafter NACDL]. 
31.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972). 
32.  NACDL, supra note 30, at 31. 
33.  Richard Klein, Judicial Misconduct in Criminal Cases: It’s Not Just the Counsel Who May 
Be Ineffective and Unprofessional, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 203 (2006). 
34.  See generally Roberts, supra note 30, at 297–306 (discussing the complexities of 
misdemeanor practice, and the major collateral consequences that can result from even a minor 
criminal conviction); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 300–14 (2009) (identifying 
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The recent federal court decision in Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon35 
illustrates this premium on speedy dispositions, free of the inefficiencies 
of robust adversarial tests like a trial. In Wilbur, two Washington State 
cities (“Cities”) contracted with a law office to provide public defense in 
misdemeanor matters.36 Plaintiffs sued the Cities, claiming that through 
these contracts, the Cities systemically supplied constitutionally 
inadequate public defense services.37 After holding a trial, the District 
Court found: 
The period of time during which [counsel] provided public 
defense services for the Cities was marked by an almost 
complete absence of opportunities for the accused to confer with 
appointed counsel in a confidential setting. Most interactions 
occurred in the courtroom: discussions regarding possible 
defenses, the need for investigation, existing physical or mental 
health issues, immigration status, client goals, and potential 
dispositions were, if they occurred at all, perfunctory and/or 
public. There is almost no evidence that [counsel] conducted 
investigations in any of their thousands of cases, nor is there any 
suggestion that they did legal analysis regarding the elements of 
the crime charged or possible defenses or that they discussed 
such issues with their clients. Substantive hearings and trials 
during that era were rare. In general, counsel presumed that the 
police officers had done their job correctly and negotiated a plea 
bargain based on that assumption. . . . Adversarial testing of the 
government’s case was so infrequent that it was virtually a non-
factor in the functioning of the Cities’ criminal justice 
system. . . . [I]n light of the sheer number of cases [counsel] 
handled, the services they offered to their indigent clients 
amounted to little more than a “meet and plead” system.38 
I cannot imagine that the practices challenged in Wilbur would seem 
terribly anomalous to most experienced public defenders and 
prosecutors. Anecdotally, I have seen lawyers plead dozens of clients 
guilty during a single first appearance court session. These lawyers were 
typically doing the best they could under the circumstances to help their 
collateral consequences to high-volume misdemeanor dispositions, in addition to incarceration, to 
include immigration, public housing, driving, employment, community, procedural justice, 
substantive justice, and lawyer ethics consequences). 
35.  989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
36.  Id. at 1124. 
37.  Id. at 1123. 
38.  Id. at 1124. 
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clients by seizing on a quick disposition opportunity to avoid a more 
damaging possible case outcome, or by avoiding pre-trial incarceration 
because the client could not afford bail.39 But no one seriously would 
argue that criminal convictions obtained by guilty plea on the first or 
second court appearance are generally the product of meaningful 
adversarial testing of the prosecution’s accusation.40 Even more, no one 
would suggest that these cases suffer from justice delayed. 
This speedy-disposition emphasis can occur in more serious cases too, 
and even in federal court. For example, under “Operation Streamline,” 
federal defendants in unlawful reentry immigration cases41 commonly 
plead guilty after meeting with a lawyer for only thirty minutes about the 
case and any possible defenses.42 These defendants may go from charge 
to conviction in one day, pleading guilty as part of a group hearing, 
where the judge takes a plea from multiple defendants at once.43 
Unlawful reentry cases, however, are serious matters authorizing up to 
two years of imprisonment.44 Unlawful reentry cases with aggravated 
circumstances can authorize up to twenty years.45 Even in return for 
foregoing numerous protections that the Constitution guarantees, many 
39.  See Robert Lewis, No Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind Bars, WNYC NEWS (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-bars/ (noting study showing that 
for every 100 defendants who have $500 bail imposed, only nineteen defendants will post bail at 
arraignment, and forty defendants will remain in jail until their case is decided); Julie Turkewitz, 
Experimental Program Helps Defendants Make Bail in Backlogged Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2014, at A22 (recounting choice of defendant charged with misdemeanor crimes and facing $1,000 
bail: “[p]lead guilty and go home, or sit in jail and wait for a trial”). One recent study found that 
76.5 percent of federal defendants were detained by the court prior to trial or other case disposition. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009, at 10 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
40.  See Zeidman, supra note 30, at 222 (observing that “the criminal court in practice is hardly 
adversarial”); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 339 (2005) (opining that “[a]lthough the Criminal Court has been fraught 
with problems, an overabundance of adversarialness is not one of them”); Gerald E. Lynch, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2118 (1998) (commenting 
on how criminal justice in most instances has become more administrative in nature than 
adversarial). 
41.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1996). 
42.  See Joshua Partlow, In Arizona Court, a Fast Track to Jail and Then Home for Illegal 
Immigrants, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2014, at A11; Amanda Myers, More Hispanics Go To Federal 
Prison, USA TODAY, (June 4, 2011, 11:01 AM),  http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/ 
2011-06-04-immigration-hispanic-offenders-federal-prison_n.htm. 
43.  See Partlow, supra note 42, at A11. 
44.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (authorizing two years in prison for unlawful reentry offense). 
45.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (authorizing up to twenty years in prison for unlawful reentry offense 
with certain aggravating factors). 
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fast-track defendants still receive jail terms of thirty to 180 days.46 These 
fast-track guilty plea proceedings are wondrously efficient, and no one 
would worry that these cases are defying the Act. Yet, some 
commentators have argued that the efficiency of these fast-track 
programs is “endangering our very justice system.”47 
My point is not to argue that we do not have the speedy trial problem 
elucidated by Hopwood. We certainly do. But in my view, this problem 
is not an independent, free-standing phenomenon. Rather, this problem 
is one side of a two-sided speedy trial dynamic, with both too much and 
too little efficiency bookending a more optimal efficiency and efficacy 
range of criminal justice. 
II. MANAGING THE TWO-SIDED SPEEDY TRIAL PROBLEM 
How did we get to this two-sided speedy trial dynamic, with too much 
efficiency on one side and too little efficiency on the other side? The 
dynamic did not arise from the will of any one institutional actor. As 
Hopwood asserts, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers collude from 
mutual, institutional interests to delay criminal trials48— a phenomenon 
not restricted to federal court.49 And, a similar “we’re in this together” 
mentality can operate at the other end of the speedy trial dynamic, where 
the system pushes defendants to plead guilty, and to plead guilty 
quickly.50 
To de-calcify this institutional congruence at the delay end of the 
speedy trial spectrum, Hopwood proposes several doctrinal solutions to 
improve implementation of the Act.51 These thoughtful solutions would 
help if taken seriously. Similarly, the system would benefit from further 
doctrinal clarity at the other end of the speedy trial spectrum regarding 
how lawyers and courts should process guilty pleas at high volumes.52 
46.  See Partlow, supra note 42, at A11. 
47.  Id. (quoting criminal defense lawyer and immigration activist who opposes fast-track plea 
proceedings). 
48.  Hopwood, supra note 1, at 738–39. 
49.  See Glaberson, supra note 19, at A1 (reporting that “[f]ailures by nearly every component of 
the criminal justice system have contributed to what is known inside the building as a ‘culture of 
delay,’” practiced by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges). 
50.  See Zeidman, supra note 30, at 217; cf. also Partlow, supra note 42, at A11 (noting defense 
lawyer who participates in fast-track plea proceedings who nevertheless self-assessed the quality of 
this representation positively). 
51.  See Hopwood, supra note 1, at 740–42. 
52.  See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2011) (addressing how lawyers 
can ensure effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment during the plea bargaining process when 
the plan implicates immigration consequences for the client); Lafler v. Cooper, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 
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The conclusion is difficult to resist, however, that disobedience of 
doctrine is more of a symptom, and not the source of, the problem.53 
Lawyers and judges do not typically delay trials because they are lazy or 
do not care about the administration of justice. More often, in my 
experience, defense lawyers delay trials because of high caseloads that 
require more time to investigate, consult with clients, obtain and review 
complex discovery, and complete other work necessary for competent 
and diligent trial preparation.54 Judges, in turn, delay trials because they 
have packed dockets and do not have the staff or courtrooms to resolve 
pre-trial issues efficiently across all these cases and also conduct jury 
trials.55 Prosecutors also are not ready for trial due to their own resource 
constraints.56 The same phenomenon controls at the other end of the 
spectrum where defense lawyers, judges, and prosecutors take too many 
guilty pleas with too little adversarial testing of criminal charges: the 
demands of an over-burdened criminal justice system force this hand on 
everyone.57 
Doctrinal solutions targeting these institutional actors and their 
individual decisions thus, at least to some degree, ask these actors to fix 
a structural problem by doing more work with the same—or even 
fewer—resources.58 Criminal justice actors must be more efficient in 
trial matters with the same caseloads, the same staff, the same resources, 
1376 (2012) (addressing effective assistance in plea bargaining); Missouri v. Frye, __U.S.__, 132 S. 
Ct. 1399 (2012) (addressing effective assistance in plea bargaining). 
53.  Cf. Zeidman, supra note 30, at 206 (noting that if the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla 
regarding immigration advice in criminal cases in fact addresses a problem “of national 
dimension, . . . we run the risk of fashioning a solution, in this case by way of the holding in 
Padilla, that addresses only the symptoms”). 
54.  Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011) (defining competence); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011) (defining diligence). 
55.  The United States Courts recently reported that in the fiscal year ending in September 2014, 
677 federal District Court judges handled 392,241 filings alone, apart from case terminations and 
pending matters. These judges’ overall caseloads thus permitted them to average eighteen trials 
completed in the year. See U.S. COURTS, United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload 
Profile, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourt 
ManagementStatistics/2014/district-fcms-profiles-september-2014.pdf (last visited March 10, 
2015). 
56.  In Wilbur, for example, the District Court found that due to resource limitations, the people 
of the city “received even more ineffective representation than the individuals charged with crimes.” 
Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 n.7 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
57.  See Zeidman, supra note 30, at 207 (noting that “[i]t is also beyond question that many of 
these faulty pleas are the result of the chronic underfunding and resultant overburdening of public 
defenders who labor under crushing caseloads”). 
58.  See Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 n.9 (noting that the federal court system, which had long 
served as the “gold standard” for indigent public defense, “has been adversely affected by 
successive years of reduced budgets and the 2013 sequestration cuts”). 
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the same remuneration. Yet, to make the room necessary for this 
efficiency, these solutions expect these actors to dispose of hundreds or 
thousands of cases carefully and competently, still with the same 
caseloads, the same staff, the same resources, the same remuneration. 
Thus, as one scholar observed, “while lawyer [or court] ignorance, 
indifference, and malevolence are part of the problem, a focus on 
individual lawyering practices [or court decisions] obfuscates the larger, 
structural issue—indigent defense systems with otherwise competent 
attorneys [and courts] who are under-resourced, overwhelmed, and 
overburdened with cases.”59 
The two-sided speedy trial dynamic accordingly should be treated as a 
structural, systemic problem, and not solely as the product of poor 
individual legal judgments.60 Indeed, a contrary message of do-more-
with-less can breed deep institutional skepticism, which I have 
witnessed, in whether society truly cares about the values that the 
doctrine is telling lawyers and judges to prioritize in individual decision-
making—like a speedy trial. If society really wants speedier trials, the 
law meaningfully would address some of structural barriers to speedy 
trials for lawyers and judges who take their roles seriously. If society 
wants well-advised guilty pleas that follow meaningful adversarial 
testing of the government’s case, society should address some of the 
structural barriers to eliminating meet-and-plead systems of justice. 
Some jurisdictions are taking these barriers to both efficient and 
effective criminal justice more seriously. For example, the Washington 
State Supreme Court has adopted indigent defense standards, including 
detailed caseload standards, to help to ensure that lawyers have the 
competence, resources, and time to work deliberately on all criminal 
matters, but also to work efficiently in cases heading to trial.61 The 
59.  Zeidman, supra note 30, at 210. 
60.  Cf. Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (finding that “municipal policymakers have made 
deliberate choices regarding the funding, contracting, and monitoring of the public defense system 
that directly and predictably caused the deprivation”); see generally Roberts, supra note 30, at 329–
70 (exploring misdemeanor ineffectiveness as an institutional and structural dynamic). 
61.  See In the Matter of the Adoption of New Standards for Indigent Def. and Certification of 
Compliance, Ord. No. 25700-A-1004 (Wash. 2012); Roberts, supra note 30, at 356–59 (noting the 
importance of misdemeanor professional standards). In April 2013, the Washington State Supreme 
Court delayed the implementation of the misdemeanor caseload standard to January 1, 2015, to 
permit more study of attorney time in misdemeanor cases, and for the Washington Office of Public 
Defense to develop a model misdemeanor case weighting policy. See In the Matter of the Standards 
for Indigent Def. Implementation of CrR 3.1(d), JuCR 9.2(d) and CrRLJ 3.1(d), Ord. No. 25700-A-
1016 (Wash. 2013); WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., Model Misdemeanor Case Weighting 
Policy (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0192-
2014_MM_CaseWeightingPolicy.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
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Wilbur decision holding local municipalities constitutionally accountable 
for passing the burden of competency and efficiency to lawyers and 
judges also should incentivize important structural changes.62 Perhaps 
following Wilbur’s lead, New York State settled an important lawsuit 
challenging its public defense systems, agreeing to significant resource 
and training reforms.63 
These kinds of structural changes should help to bring the two sides 
of the speedy trial coin closer together and into equilibrium. Well-
trained and -resourced lawyers and courts will move cases more 
efficiently to trial.64 And, better-trained and -resourced lawyers and 
courts less likely will steamroll defendants into overly efficient 
dispositions. Rather, when the two sides of the speedy trial coin 
converge, more of the cases typically plea-bargained too speedily instead 
may enjoy a speedy trial, as Hopwood envisions.65 
CONCLUSION 
Hopwood’s paper champions the maxim, “justice delayed is justice 
denied.”66 Looking at the fuller picture of criminal justice, I might prefer 
the version of this maxim I recall from Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter 
from Birmingham Jail: “justice too long delayed is justice denied.”67 Not 
because delays contrary to justice should be tolerated for any time. 
Rather, because the flip side of justice delayed can be an equal danger: a 
rushed, unconsidered justice. We must calibrate our criminal justice 
62.  At a minimum, Wilbur has changed the structure of public defense services in the Cities 
subject to the District Court’s order. See Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–37 (ordering injunctive 
relief against the Cities, including appointment of a Public Defense Supervisor and data collection 
and reporting requirements). But the Cities also paid a hefty price in attorney fees after losing in 
Wilbur. See Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, Ord. Awarding Fees and Costs, No. C11-1100RSL 
Dkt. No. 354 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2014) (awarding $2,168,653.70 in attorney fees and $43,496.50 
in expenses). If municipalities’ liability insurers become an advocate for criminal justice reform, 
real change could be on the horizon. 
63.  See N.Y.C.L.U., Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New York 
State, (Oct. 21, 2014), available at http://www.nyclu.org/news/settlement-begins-historic-
reformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
64.  Cf. Emily Rose, Note, Speedy Trial as a Viable Challenge to Chronic Underfunding in 
Indigent-Defense Systems, 113 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2014) (arguing that “the right to speedy 
trial is inextricably linked to providing adequate resources for indigent-defense systems”). 
65.  Cf. Zeidman, supra note 30, at 221 (calling for “fewer pleas and more adversarial trials”). 
66.  Hopwood, supra note 1, at 710.  
67.  Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr., 5–6, original document available at THE MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR. RESEARCH AND EDUC. INST., STAN. UNIV., http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu:5801/transcription/document_images/undecided/630416-019.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
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system to provide both speedy and deliberate trials across the full run of 
cases. 
This kind of calibration in our complex and vast modern criminal 
justice system will necessitate deep structural changes. These structural 
changes, combined with important doctrinal reforms of the sort proposed 
by Hopwood, should present the best antidote to both sides of the speedy 
trial dynamic ably uncovered by Hopwood in The Not So Speedy Trial 
Act. The result, I hope, will be a criminal justice system that is not too 
fast, and not too slow, but just right.68 
 
68.  See WIKIPEDIA, The Goldilocks Principle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldilocks_principle 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
 
                                                     
